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Abstract
We formalize the current practice of strategic mining in multi-cryptocurrency
markets as a game, and prove that any better-response learning in such games
converges to equilibrium. We then offer a reward design scheme that moves the
system configuration from any initial equilibrium to a desired one for any better-
response learning of the miners. Our work introduces the first multi-coin strategic
attack for adaptive and learning miners, as well as the study of reward design in a
multi-agent system of learning agents.
1 Introduction
Cryptocurrencies are an arms race. Hundreds of digital coins have crept into the worldwide market in
the last decade [6], including more than a dozen with over a billion dollar Market Cap, e.g., [11, 1, 8,
3, 9]. The vast majority of cryptocurrencies are based on the notion of proof of work (PoW) [25]. As
a result, the major strategic players in the context of cryptocurrencies are miners who devote their
power to solving computational puzzles to find PoWs [25, 11].
The miners for a particular coin usually gain rewards that are proportional to the power they invest
in the coin out of the total invested power (in the coin) by all miners. Each coin, therefore, can be
viewed as having some weight that reflects the reward it divides among its miners. In practice, a
coin’s weight (or reward) depends on its transaction rate, transaction fees, and its fiat exchange rate.
While the above description is not complete, it does capture the fundamental decision faced by the
miner: where should I mine? One indication for reward-based coin switching can be found online in
websites like www.whattomine.com [10], where miners enter their mining parameters (technology,
power, cost, et cetra) and get a list of coins they can mine for, ordered by their profitability. Another
interesting example happened on November 12 (2017) [5], when a dramatic change in the Bitcoin to
Bitcoin Cash [1] (a spin-off from Bitcoin) exchange rate led to a major inrush of miners from Bitcoin
to Bitcoin Cash (see Figure 1).
All in all, the structure of the cryptocurrency market suggests that we face here a game among miners,
where each miner wishes to mine coins of heavy weights while avoiding competition with other
miners. In this paper we introduce for the first time the study of the cryptocurrency market as a
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(a) Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash exchange rates over time. (b) Hashrate corresponds to the number of miners.
Figure 1: Miners move from Bitcoin to Bitcoin Cash.
game, consisting of a set of strategic players (miners) with possibly different mining powers and a set
of coins with possibly different rewards (weights). The miners are free to choose to mine for any
coin from the set, and we consider general better-response learning of the miners. That is, whenever
any miner may benefit from deviating (i.e., changing the coin it mines for), some miner will take
a step that improves his payoff; we allow an arbitrary sequence of such individual improvement
steps (sometimes called improving path [24]). In our first major result we prove that any such better
response learning converges to a (pure) equilibrium regardless of miner powers and coin rewards!
This result is obtained by showing an ordinal potential, which according to [24], implies that arbitrary
better response learning converges to equilibrium.
Having at hand the above fundamental result, we move to a discussion of strategic manipulation [27].
While many efforts have been invested in the study of crypto-related manipulations [15, 29, 26, 14],
we introduce for the first time the manipulation of the miners’ learning and optimization process.
Given that a shift in the weight of a coin may influence miner behavior [10], in the cryptocurrency
setting, it is quite possible for an interested party to affect this weight, either by creating additional
transactions with high fees (sometimes called whale transactions [22]) or by manipulating the coin
exchange rate [16, 7, 4, 2]. This way, a miner (or another interested party) can attempt to change
the system equilibrium to a better one for them. We show that under broad circumstances, for every
equilibrium of such a game, there exists a miner and another equilibrium in which the miner’s payoff
is higher. The question is therefore: can one design rewards (i.e., temporarily increase coin weights)
in a way that will lead the system from a given equilibrium to a desired one, so that the system will
remain in the desired equilibrium after reverting to the original weights? Note that such reward design
allows the manipulator to pay a finite cost while gaining an advantage indefinitely.
The above reward design problem is challenging since miners might take any better response step,
and may make their moves in any order. Given the (modified) weights, we can use our previous
major result to claim that any better response learning will converge to an equilibrium. Notice that
the latter may not be the desired one, but now we can modify the rewards again. In the second major
result of this paper we show that such desired reward design for learning agents is feasible! Namely,
we provide a (multi-step) algorithm for assigning rewards in equilibrium states that moves learning
agents from any initial equilibrium to a desired one.
In summary, our contributions are as follows:
1. We formalize strategic mining in multi-cryptocurrency markets as a game (Section 2).
2. We prove that any better-response learning in such games, starting from an arbitrary config-
uration, converges to equilibrium (Section 3).
3. We show that, in many cases, for every equilibrium there is a miner and another equilibrium
in which the miner’s payoff is higher (Section 4).
4. We offer a reward design scheme that moves the system configuration from any initial
equilibrium to a desired one for any better-response learning of the miners (Section 5).
For space limitations, the proofs of some of the claims we state here are deferred to Appendices C - F.
1.1 Related work
Results on better response learning convergence to pure equilibrium are rare and are typically
restricted to games with exact potential [18, 24], which coincide with congestion games. We show
that our game does not have an exact potential (Section 3), and in fact our game belongs to the larger
class of ID congestion games, where the payoff of a player depends on the player and the identity
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of other players who choose a similar resource, rather than on their number only. While there exist
extensions of congestion games in which better-response learning converges to equilibrium (e.g., a
restricted form of player-specific congestion games [23], which does not include our game), such
results are extremely rare in the context of ID congestion games.
Unlike works on learning in games that emphasize adapting specific machine learning algorithms to
minimize regret [18, 28, 34, 13], we assume minimal rationality on behalf of the players, i.e., that
they follow an arbitrary better response step improving their individual payoffs.
Our work also expands literature on reward design [31, 17, 32], and to the best of our knowledge, is
the first to introduce reward design for learning agents in a multi-agent setting. While seminal works
in reward design assign/modify state rewards in a reinforcement learning context [33], we design
rewards for equilibrium states for any better response learning.
Though several previous works presented game theoretical analyses for cryptocurrencies [22, 15, 29,
26, 12, 21, 20, 14, 30], the vast majority of them deal (in one way or another) with miners’ incentives
to follow the coins’ mining protocols. Our work is the first to extend the study to a multi-coin setting
and establish fundamental game theoretical results therein.
2 Model
A system in our model is a tuple 〈Π, C〉, where Π is a finite set of n miners (players) and C is a
finite set of coins (resources). A miner p ∈ Π has mining power mp ∈ R+, which it can invest in
one of the coins , i.e., the set of possible actions of p is C. We denote the set of configurations of
a system Q = 〈Π, C〉 as SQ , Cn and denote by s.p the action of player p ∈ Π in configuration
s ∈ SQ. When clear from the context, we omit the subscript indicating the system and simply write
S. Given s ∈ S and c ∈ C, we denote by Pc(s) ⊆ Π the set of miners who mine for c in s, i.e.,
Pc(s) , {p ∈ Π | s.p = c}, and by Mc(s) their total mining power, i.e., Mc(s) , Σp∈Pc(s)mp. For
s ∈ SQ, p ∈ Π, c ∈ C we denote by (s−p, c) the configuration that is identical to s except that s.p
is replaced by c.
A reward function F : C → R+ maps coins to rewards. A game GΠ,C,F consists of a system 〈Π, C〉
and a reward function F . Every coin in a game GΠ,C,F divides its reward among all the players that
mine for it, and the miners’ payoffs are defined as follows: For s ∈ S, the revenue per unit (RPU) of
coin c in s is RPUc(GΠ,C,F )(s) , F (c)Mc(s) . When clear from the context, we omit the the parameter
indicating the game. The payoff function of a miner p ∈ Π is up(s) , mp F (s.p)Ms.p(s) = mp ·RPUs.p(s).
Given a game GΠ,C,F , a configuration s ∈ S, a miner p ∈ Π, and a coin c ∈ C, we say that p moves
from s.p to c in s if it changes its action from s.p to c. A move from s.p to c is a better response
step for p if up(s) < up((s−p, c)). We say that a miner p ∈ Π is stable in a configuration s in game
GΠ,C,F if p has no better response steps in s. A configuration s is stable or a (pure) equilibrium
if every miner p ∈ Π is stable in s. A better response learning from s in GΠ,C,F is a sequence of
configurations resulting from a sequence of better response steps starting from s, which is either
infinite or ends with a stable configuration. In case it is finite, we say that it converges to its final
configuration.
A function f : S → R is an ordinal potential for a game GΠ,C,F if for any two configurations
s, s′ ∈ S s.t. some better response step of a miner p ∈ Π leads from s to s′, it holds that f(s) < f(s′).
If, in addition, f(s′) − f(s) = up(s′) − up(s), then f is an exact potential. By [24], if a game
GΠ,C,F has an ordinal potential, then every better response learning converges.
3 Better response learning convergance
In this section we prove that although a game GΠ,C,F has no exact potential, every better-response
learning of the miners in game GΠ,C,F converges to a stable configuration (pure equilibrium)
regardless of the sets Π and C and the reward function F . To gain intuition, the reader is referred to
our Appendix A and B, where we show how to construct a particular equilibrium in a game GΠ,C,F
for any Π, C and F , and give a simple ordinal potential function for the symmetric case in which F
is a constant function i.e., ∀c, c′ ∈ C, F (c) = F (c′), respectively.
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No exact potential. We start by showing that our game does not have an exact potential.
Proposition 1. The game GΠ,C,F does not always have an exact potential.
Proof. Let GΠ,C,F be a game where Π = {p1, p2}, mp1 = 2,mp2 = 1, C = {c1, c2}, and
F (c1) = F (c2) = 1. Assume by way of contradiction that GΠ,C,F has an exact potential function
H , and consider the following four configurations:
• s1 = 〈c1, c1〉. Payoffs: up1(s1) = F (c1)·mp1mp1+mp2 = 2/3, up2(s
1) =
F (c1)·mp2
mp1+mp2
= 1/3.
• s2 = 〈c1, c2〉. Payoffs: up1(s2) = F (c1)·mp1mp1 = 1, up2(s
2) =
F (c2)·mp2
mp2
= 1.
• s3 = 〈c2, c2〉. Payoffs: up1(s3) = F (c2)·mp1mp1+mp2 = 2/3, up2(s
3) =
F (c2)·mp2
mp1+mp2
= 1/3.
• s4 = 〈c2, c1〉. Payoffs: up1(s4) = F (c2)·mp1mp1 = 1, up2(s
4) =
F (c1)·mp2
mp2
= 1.
Note that H(s2)−H(s1) +H(s3)−H(s2) +H(s4)−H(s3) +H(s1)−H(s4) = 0. However, by
definition of exact potential, we get that (H(s2)−H(s1)) + (H(s3)−H(s2)) + (H(s4)−H(s3)) +
(H(s1)−H(s4)) = (2/3) + (−1/3) + (2/3) + (−1/3) = 2/3 6= 0. A contradiction.
Ordinal potential. To show an ordinal potential, we use the following definitions:
For a configuration s ∈ S in a game GΠ,C,F , we define list(s) to be the sequence of pairs in
{〈RPUc(s), c〉 | c ∈ C} ordered lexicographically from smallest to largest. Denote by vi(s) the
coin (second element of the pair) in the ith entry in list(s). Consider the ordered set 〈L,≺L〉, where
L , {list(s) | s ∈ S} is the set of all possible lists in GΠ,C,F , and ≺L is the lexicographical order.
The rank of a list list(s) ∈ L, rank(list(s)), is the rank of list(s) in ≺L from smallest to largest.
Note that since Π and C are finite, we know that S and L are finite. The following two observations
establish a connection between better response steps and the RPUs of the associated coins.
Observation 1. Consider a game GΠ,C,F , s ∈ S, vi(s) ∈ C, and p ∈ Π s.t. s.p = vi(s). Then in
every better response step of p that changes s.p to a coin vj(s), it holds that j > i.
Observation 2. Consider a gameGΠ,C,F . If some better response step from configuration s to config-
uration s′ of a miner p changes s.p = c to s′.p = c′, then RPUc(s) < min(RPUc(s′), RPUc′(s′)).
We are now ready to prove that any game GΠ,C,F has an ordinal potential function.
Theorem 1. For any finite sets Π and C of miners and coins and reward function F , H(s) ,
rank(list(s)) is an ordinal potential in the game GΠ,C,F .
Proof. Consider two configurations s, s′ ∈ S s.t. some better response step of a miner p ∈ Π leads
from configuration s to configuration s′, and let vi(s) = s.p and vj(s) = s′.p. We need to show that
H(s) < H(s′). Since only the RPUs of vi(s) and vj(s) are affected we get that
∀k 6= i, j RPUvk(s)(s) = RPUvk(s)(s′). (1)
By Observation 1, we get that j > i, and thus ∀k, 1 ≤ k < i, RPUvk(s)(s) = RPUvk(s)(s′). By
Observation 2, we get that min(RPUvi(s)(s
′), RPUvj(s)(s
′)) > RPUvi(s)(s), and thus, together
with the definition of vi and Equation 1, we get that ∀k, i ≤ k ≤ |C|, RPUvk(s)(s′) ≥ RPUvi(s)(s).
Therefore, none of them “move down” to a position before i in list(s′) and so
∀k, 1 ≤ k < i, 〈RPUvk(s)(s), vk(s)〉 = 〈RPUvk(s′)(s′), vk(s′)〉. (2)
That is, the first i− 1 elements of list(s) are equal to the first i− 1 elements of list(s′). Hence, it
suffices to show that the ith element of list(s′) is lexicographically larger than the ith element of
list(s). Let vl(s) = vi(s′). From Equation 2, we know that l ≥ i, so there are two possible cases:
• First, l ∈ {i, j}. The theorem follows from Observation 2.
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• Second, l > i, l 6= j. In this case,
〈RPUvi(s)(s), vi(s)〉 < 〈RPUvl(s)(s), vl(s)〉 (lexicographical order of list(s))
= 〈RPUvl(s)(s′), vl(s)〉 (Equation 1)
= 〈RPUvi(s′)(s′), vi(s′)〉 (Definition of vl(s)),
as needed.
4 There is often a better equilibrium
Before moving to our second major result in which we describe a manipulation through dynamic
reward design that transitions the system between equilibria, in this section we show that under broad
circumstances, in every stable configuration there is at least one miner who has higher payoff in
another stable configuration. This means that such a miner will gain from moving the system there.
Specifically, we prove this for games that satisfy the following assumptions (note that we use these
assumptions only in this section):
Assumption 1 (Never alone). For a configuration s ∈ S in a game GΠ,C,F , if there is a coin c ∈ C
s.t. |Pc(s)| ≤ 1, then there is a miner p ∈ Π s.t. changing s.p to c is a better response step for p.
Although this assumption cannot hold when |Π| < 2|C|, it often holds in practice since the number
of miners must be much larger than the number of coins for the cryptocurrency to be secure (truly
decentralized).
Assumption 2 (Generic game). For any two coins c 6= c′ ∈ C and two sets of players P, P ′ ⊆ Π in
a game GΠ,C,F ,
F (c)
Σp∈Pmp
6= F (c′)Σp∈P ′mp .
This assumption is common in game theory [19], and it makes sense in our game since mining power
in practice is measured in billions of operations per hour and coin rewards are coupled with coin fiat
exchange rates, so exact equality is unlikely.
The following observation follows from Assumption 1 and the fact that coins that are chosen by at
least one miner always divide their entire reward. It stipulates that in every stable configuration, the
sum of the payoffs the miners get is equal to the sum of the coins’ rewards.
Observation 3 (All stable configurations are globally optimal). For every stable configuration s ∈ S
in a game GΠ,C,F under Assumption 1, it holds that
∑
p∈Πup(s) =
∑
c∈CF (c).
From Observation 3 and Assumption 2 it is easy to show the following claim:
Claim 4. Consider a game GΠ,C,F under Assumptions 1 and 2. If the game has more than one stable
configuration, then for every stable configuration s there exist a miner p and a stable configuration s′
s.t. up(s′) > up(s).
It remains to show that GΠ,C,F has more than one stable configuration. Consider Π = {p1, . . . , pn}
s.t. mp1 ≥ mp2 ≥ . . . ≥ mpn , and ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let Πi = {p1, . . . , pi}. We first show that the game
GΠ2,C,F has two different configurations in which miners p1, p2 do not share a coin and at most one
of them is unstable. Then, we inductively construct two configurations in GΠi,C,F , ∀i, 3 ≤ i ≤ n,
based on the two configurations in GΠi−1,C,F , in which all miners in Πi−1 keep their locations and
all miners except maybe the one that was unstable in GΠ1,C,F are stable. The construction step is
captured by Claim 5, where pnew = pi in the ith step.
Claim 5. Let F be a reward function. Consider a system Q = 〈Π, C〉, and a configuration
s ∈ SQ. Now consider another system Q′ = 〈Π′, C〉 s.t. Π′ = Π ∪ {pnew}, pnew 6∈ Π, and
mpnew ≤ min{mp|p ∈ Π}. Let c = argmax
c′∈C
F (c′) mpnewMc′ (s)+mpnew and consider a configuration
s′ ∈ SQ′ s.t. for all p ∈ Π s′.p = s.p and s′.pnew = c. Then pnew is stable in s′ in game GΠ′,C,F ,
and every player p ∈ Π that is stable in s in GΠ,C,F is also stable in s′ in GΠ′,C,F .
Finally, we show that the two configurations we construct in GΠ,C,F are stable: Let pns be the
(possibly) unstable miner. By Assumption 1 (note that the assumption refers only to game GΠ,C,F ),
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pns cannot be alone in a coin (otherwise there must be another unstable miner), and thus it shares the
coin with a smaller stable miner, which we show implies that pns is stable.
Our results are captured by the following proposition, which follows from Claim 4 and and the
inductive construction using Claim 5.
Proposition 2. Consider a game GΠ,C,F under Assumptions 1 and 2. Then for every stable configu-
ration s in GΠ,C,F there exist a miner p and a stable configuration s′ 6= s in which up(s′) > up(s).
5 Reward design: moving between equilibria
In this section we consider a system Q = 〈Π, C〉, where Π = {p1, . . . pn} s.t. mp1 > mp2 >
. . . > mpn . For every reward function F and every two stable configurations s0, sf ∈ SQ in game
GΠ,C,F we describe a mechanism to move the system from s0 to the desired configuration sf by
temporarily increasing coin rewards. Note that once we lead the system to sf , we can return to the
original rewards (i.e., stop manipulating coin weights) because sf is stable in GΠ,C,F . Therefore, a
manipulator who gains from moving to a desired stable configuration can do it with a bounded cost.
We first define a reward design function that maps system configurations to reward functions.
Definition 1 (reward design function). Consider a system Q. A reward design function F for system
Q is a function mapping every configuration s ∈ SQ to a reward function, i.e., F (s) : C → R+.
Dynamic reward design. Consider a system 〈Π, C〉 and a reward function F . A dynamic reward
design mechanism for game GΠ,C,F is an algorithm that for any two stable configurations s0, sf in
GΠ,C,F moves the system from s0 to sf by following the protocol in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 protocol to move a system 〈Π, C〉 with reward function F from s0 to sf .
1: s← s0
2: repeat
3: choose a reward design function H s.t. for all c ∈ C, H(s)(c) ≥ F (c)
4: allow better-response learning in GΠ,C,H(s), starting from s, to converge to some stable
configuration s′ . convergence is due to Theorem 1
5: s← s′
6: until s = sf
5.1 Reward design algorithm
To describe a dynamic reward design algorithm we need to specify the reward design function for
every loop iteration in Algorithm 1. Intuitively, we observe that miners with less mining power are
easily moved between coins, meaning that we can increase a coin reward so that a small miner with
little mining power will benefit from moving there, but bigger miners with more mining power prefer
to stay in their current locations. Therefore, the idea is to evolve the current configuration to sf ∈ S
in n = |Π| stages, where in stage i, we move the n− i+ 1 miners with the smallest mining powers to
the location (coin) of miner pi in the final configuration sf (i.e., sf .pi) while keeping the remaining
miners in their (final) places. To this end, we define n intermediate configurations. For i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
we define si as:
si.pk =
{
sf .pk ∀1 ≤ k ≤ i
sf .pi ∀i < k ≤ n (3)
That is, in si, miners p1, . . . , pi are in their final locations and miners pi, . . . , pn are in the final
location of miner pi. Note that sn = sf . Figure 2a illustrates the stage transitions in the algorithm.
Notice that since we allow arbitrary better response learning (in every iteration), choosing a reward
design function is a subtle task; miners can move according to any better response step, and we
cannot control the order in which miners move. One may attempt to design a reward function so that
in the resulting game there is exactly one unstable miner with exactly one better response step in
the current configuration. However, even given such a function, after that miner takes its step, other
miners might become unstable, which can in turn lead to a learning process that depends on the order
in which miners move and on the choices they make (in case they have more than one better response
6
(a) Configuration si. (b) Iteration moving pmi(s); pai(s) is the anchor.
Figure 2: Reward design algorithm: (a) stages; and (b) iteration within stage i. Boxes represent coins,
discs represent miners. The unlabeled bottom discs represent possible bigger miners who are in their
final locations.
step). Hence, the main challenge is to be able to restrict the set of the possible stable configurations
reached by learning phase in each iteration.
In every loop iteration of stage i > 1 we pick a miner pk that we want to move from sf .pi−1 to
sf .pi (as explained shortly) and choose the reward function carefully so that (1) pk’s only better
response step is sf .pi, (2) all other miners are stable, and (3) in every stable configuration reached by
better response learning after pk’s step, pk is in sf .pi, all miners pk+1, . . . , pn are in either sf .pi−1
or sf .pi, and all the other (bigger) miners remain in their (final) locations.
Moreover, our proof shows by induction that our reward design function of stage i (defined below)
guarantees that the set of possible configurationas reached by learning in stage i > 1 is
Ti , {s ∈ S | (∀k, 1 ≤ k ≤ i− 1 : s.pk = sf .pk) ∧ (∀k, i ≤ k ≤ n : s.pk ∈ {sf .pi, sf .pi−1)}}.
Notice that the stage starts at si−1 ∈ Ti. We now explain how we choose the reward design function
for stage i. First, for every configuration s ∈ Ti \ {si}, the index of the miner we want to move from
sf .pi−1 to sf .pi (called mover) is
mi(s) = min{j|∀l, j < l ≤ n : s.pl = sf .pi}.
Note that for every s ∈ Ti, i ≤ mi(s) ≤ n. Moreover, pmi(s) 6∈ Psf .pi(s) and mi(si−1) = n.
Let ai(s) = mi(s) − 1. Intuitively, we use pai(s) as an anchor in configuration s; we choose a
reward function that increases the reward of coin sf .pi as high as possible without making the anchor
unstable. As a result, all the miners in Psf .pi−1(s) (who are bigger than or equal to the anchor) remain
stable, and miner pmi(s) has a unique better response step to move to sf .pi. Figure 2b illustrates
mi(s) and ai(s) for some configuration s ∈ Ti.
In order to make sure that miners not in Psf .pi−1(s) ∪ Psf .pi(s) also remain stable, and in order to
guarantee that that every better response learning after pmi(s)’s step converges to a configuration in
Ti, we choose a reward function that evens out the RPUs of all coins other than sf .pi. For s ∈ S, let
R(s) = max{RPUc(s) | c ∈ C} ∀s ∈ S. The reward design function Hi for stage i > 1 is:
∀i > 1 ∀s ∈ Ti ∀c ∈ C, Hi(s)(c) =
{
R(s) · (Mc(s) + mpai(s)) for c = sf .pi
R(s) ·Mc(s) otherwise (4)
Note that the RPUs of all coins except sf .pi in the game GΠ,C,Hi(s) are equal to R(s). In addition,
note that if a miner bigger than or equal to pai(s) moves to sf .pi, then sf .pi’s RPU becomes no
bigger than R(s). However, since mpmi(s) < mpai(s) , pmi(s) has a unique better response step to
move to sf .pi. Therefore, we get that our reward design function allows us to control the first step
of the learning process. In the next section we give more intuition on how it also restricts the stable
configuration at the end of any learning process at stage i to the set Ti.
As for the fist stage, note that we need to move all miners to coin sf .p1, so intuitively we only need
to increase its reward high enough. We therefore choose:
∀s ∈ S ∀c ∈ C,H1(s)(c) =
{
max{F (c′) | c′ ∈ C} · Σp∈Πmp for c = sf .p1
F (c) otherwise
(5)
In Algorithm 2 we present our reward design algorithm, and in the next section we outline the proof
that every stage eventually completes.
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Algorithm 2 Dynamic reward design algorithm.
1: s← s0
2: for i=1 . . . n do
3: repeat . Hi is defined in Equations 4 and 5
4: allow better-response learning in GΠ,C,Hi(s), starting from s, to converge to some stable
configuration s′
5: s← s′
6: until s = si . si is defined in Equations 3
5.2 Proof outline
The proof for stage 1 is straightforward so we skip it. Consider stage i > 1. We prove in the appendix
the following technical lemma about stable configurations in the stage:
Lemma 1. Consider a configuration s ∈ Ti \ {si}. Then every better response learning in the game
GΠ,C,Hi(s) that starts at s converges to a configuration s
′ ∈ Ti such that:
1. ∀k, 1 ≤ k < mi(s), s′.pk = s.pk.
2. s′.pmi(s) = sf .pi.
As part of the proof, we show that within stage i, all the reached configurations (both stable and
unstable) are in Ti. Let c = sf .pi−1 and c′ = sf .pi. After pmi(s) moves to c
′ according to its
only better response step, in the resulting configuration s′, the RPUs of all coins not in {c, c′}
remain R(s). Moreover, RPUc(s′) =
Hi(c)
Mc(s′)
= R(s)·Mc(s)Mc(s)−mpmi(s)
, and RPUc′(s′) =
Hi(c
′)
Mc′ (s′)
=
R(s)·(Mc(s)+mpai(s) )
Mc(s)+mpmi(s)
. Therefore, although RPUc(s′) > RPUc(s), it is still not high enough to drive
miners not in Pc′(s′) (by definition, bigger than pmi(s)) to move to it. So the only miners that possibly
have better response steps at s′ are miners in Pc′(s′) who wish to move to c. Moreover, the total
mining power of the miners who actually move to c is smaller than pmi(s), otherwise, c’s RPU will
go below R(s). In the proof we use the above intuition to formulate an invariant that captures the
lemma statement and prove it by induction on better response steps. The lemma then follows from
Theorem 1 (every better response learning converges to a stable configuration).
We next use Lemma 1 to prove that every stage i > 1 completes in a finite number of loop iterations.
To this end, we associate with every configuration s Ti a binary vector v(s) indicating, for each j ≥ i,
whether pj is in Psf .pi(s), where it needs to be at the end of the stage. Consider the ordered set
〈V,≺v〉, where V , {0, 1}n−i+1 is the set of all binary vectors of length n− i + 1, and ≺v is the
lexicographical order. For a configuration s ∈ Ti, we define vec(s) to be a vector in V such that:
∀j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n− i + 1, vec(s)[j] =
{
1 if pj+i−1 ∈ Psf .pi(s)
0 otherwise
and the function Φi : Ti → {1, .., |V |} to be the rank of vec(s) in V .
Theorem 2. Every stage i > 1 of Algorithm 2 completes in a finite number of loop iterations.
Proof. By definitions of stage i and set Ti, the first configuration of stage i is si−1 ∈ Ti. By definition
of mi(s) , for all s ∈ Ti \ {si}, mi(s) 6∈ Psf .pi(s). By inductively applying Lemma 1, we get that
every loop iteration in stage i ends in a configuration in Ti. Therefore, consider a loop iteration
of stage i that starts in configuration s 6= si and ends in configuration s′, we get by Lemma 1 that
mi(s) ∈ Psf .pi(s′) and ∀k, i ≤ k < mi(s), s.pk = s′.pk. Therefore Φ(s′) > Φ(s). Now since the
set Ti is finite, we get the after a finite number of iterations we reach configuration si.
6 Discussion
Our work studies and challenges the crypocurrency market from a novel angle – the strategic
selections by adaptive miners among multiple coins. There are several central followups one may
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consider. First, our reward design is effective for arbitrary better-response learning, but one may
wonder about its speed of convergence under specific markets. In addition, we consider convergence
to equilibrium, and one may consider also convergence to a bad (possibly unstable) configuration in
which, for example, a particular miner will have a dominant position in a coin, killing (at least for
a while) the basic guarantee of non-manipulation (security) for that coin and allowing him to get a
bigger portion of the reward. One also may wonder about the asymmetric case where some coins can
be mined only by a subset of the miners.
9
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Appendix A Existence of an equilibrium
We show here how to find a stable configuration (pure equilibrium) in the game GΠ,C,F for any Π, C,
and F . We do this by induction, selecting coins for miners in descending order of mining power.
Claim 6. Consider a reward function F , a system Q = 〈Π, C〉, and another system Q′ = 〈Π′, C〉
s.t. Π′ = Π ∪ {pnew}, pnew 6∈ Π, and mpnew ≤ min{mp|p ∈ Π}. Then, if the game GΠ,C,F has a
stable configuration, than the game GΠ′,C,F has a stable configuration as well.
Proof. Let s be a stable configuration in GΠ,C,F . We use it to build a configuration s′ in
GΠ′,C,F in the following way: for all p 6= pnew set s′.p = s.p, and set s′.pnew to c =
argmax
c′∈C
F (c′) mpnewMc′ (s)+mpnew . We now show that configuration s
′ is stable in GΠ′,C,F .
First, consider pnew. Since we pick c to be argmax
c′∈C
F (c′) mpnewMc′ (s)+mpnew , we get that ∀c
′ ∈ C,
F (c)
mpnew
Mc(s′)
≥ F (c′) mpnewMc′ (s′)+mpnew , so pnew is stable in s
′. Next, consider a miner p s.t. s.p =
c′ 6= c. Since s is stable, we know that ∀c′′ ∈ C, F (c′) mpMc′ (s) ≥ F (c
′′) mpMc′′ (s)+mp . Now since
Mc(s) < Mc(s
′) and for all c′′ 6= c Mc′′(s) = Mc′′(s′), we get that ∀c′′ ∈ C,F (c′) mpMc′ (s′) ≥
F (c′′) mpMc′′ (s′)+mp . Meaning that p is stable in s
′.
Finally, consider p 6= pnew s.t. s′.p = c. We need to show that for all c′ 6= c,
F (c′) mpMc′ (s′)+mp ≤ F (c)
mp
Mc(s′)
. Again, since we pick c to be argmax
c′∈C
F (c′) mpnewMcj (s)+mpnew , we
know that ∀c′ 6= c, F (c) mpnewMc(s)+mpnew ≥ F (c
′) mpnewMc′ (s)+mpnew , and thus ∀c
′ 6= c, F (c) 1Mc(s′) ≥
F (c′) 1Mc′ (s′)+mpnew . Now by the claim assumption, mpnew ≤ mp. Therefore, ∀c
′ 6= c,
F (c) 1Mc(s′) ≥ F (c′) 1Mc′ (s′)+mpnew ≥ F (c
′) 1Mc′ (s′)+mp . Thus, ∀c
′ 6= c, F (c) mpMc(s′) ≥
F (c′) mpMc′ (s′)+mp . Meaning that p is stable in s
′.
Proposition 3. For any set of of miners Π = {p1, . . . , pn}, set of coins C, and a reward function F ,
the game GΠ,C,F has a stable configuration.
Proof. Order miners by mining power so that mp1 ≥ mp2 ≥ . . . ≥ mpn . First we show that the
game G{p1},C,F has a stable configuration. Let c = argmax
c′∈C
F (c′), and define a configuration s in
G{p1},C,F as follows: s.p1 = c. Since ∀c′ ∈ C, F (c) mp1Mc(s) = F (c) ≥ F (c′) = F (c′)
mp1
Mc′ (s)+mp1
,
we get that the configuration s is stable in G{p1},C,F . The lemma follows by inductively applying
Claim 6.
Appendix B Ordinal potential for the symmetric case
We consider here the symmetric case where all coin rewards are equal, and show that any game in
this case has a simple potential function.
Proposition 4. Consider a finite set of players Π, a finite set of coins C, and a reward function F s.t.
∀c, c′ ∈ C F (c) = F (c′). Then H(s) ,
∑
c∈C
1
Mc(s)
is a potential function in the game GΠ,C,F .
Proof. Consider two configurations s, s′ ∈ S s.t. some better response step of a miner p ∈ Π
leads from configuration s to configuration s′. We need to show that H(s) > H(s′). Let c = s.p
and c′ = s′.p. By definition of a better response step, F (c′) mpMc′ (s)+mp > F (c)
mp
Mc(s)
. Since
F (c) = F (c′), we get that 1Mc′ (s)+mp >
1
Mc(s)
, and thus
Mc(s) > Mc′(s) + mp. (6)
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Now since for every c′′ /∈ {c′, c}, Mc′′(s) = Mc′′(s′), we get that
H(s′)−H(s) = 1
Mc′(s′)
+
1
Mc(s′)
− ( 1
Mc′(s)
+
1
Mc(s)
).
Moreover, since p moves from c to c′ in s, we get that
H(s′)−H(s) = 1
Mc′(s) + mp
+
1
Mc(s)−mp − (
1
Mc′(s)
+
1
Mc(s)
).
Thus, in order to show that H(s) > H(s′), we need to show that
1
Mc′(s) + mp
+
1
Mc(s)−mp <
1
Mc′(s)
+
1
Mc(s)
.
Equivalently, that
Mc(s)−mp + mp + Mc′(s)
(Mc′(s) + mp)(Mc(s)−mp) <
Mc(s) + Mc′(s)
Mc(s)Mc′(s)
,
or that
Mc(s)Mc′(s) < (Mc′(s) + mp)(Mc(s)−mp),
or finally that
Mc(s)(Mc′(s) + mp)−Mc(s)mp < (Mc′(s) + mp)Mc(s)− (Mc′(s) + mp)mp).
The proposition follows from Equation 6
Appendix C Observations’ proofs for the ordinal potential
Observation 1 (restated). Consider a game GΠ,C,F , s ∈ S, vi(s) ∈ C, and p ∈ Π s.t. s.p = vi(s).
Then in every better response step of p that changes s.p to a coin vj(s), it that j > i.
Proof. By the definition of a better response step, F (vj(s))Mvj(s)(s)+mp
> F (vi(s))Mvi(s)(s)
, and thus
RPUvj(s)(s) =
F (vj(s))
Mvj(s)(s)
> F (vi(s))Mvi(s)(s)
= RPUvi(s)(s). By definition of v(s), we get that j > i.
Observation 2 (restated). Consider a game GΠ,C,F . If some better response step from config-
uration s to configuration s′ of a miner p changes s.p = c to s′.p = c′, then RPUc(s) <
min(RPUc(s
′), RPUc′(s′)).
Proof. By definition of a better response step, RPUc′(s′) > RPUc(s). In addition, since Mc(s′) =
Mc(s)−mp, we get that RPUc(s′) = F (c)Mc(s′) =
F (c)
Mc(s)−mp >
F (c)
Mc(s)
= RPUc(s).
Appendix D There is often a better Eeuilibrium: proofs
We prove here the Claims from Section 4
Claim 4 (restated). Consider a game GΠ,C,F under Assumption 2. If the game has more than
one stable configuration, then for every stable configuration s there exist a miner p and a stable
configuration s′ s.t. up(s′) > up(s).
Proof. Consider a stable configuration s. By assumption, there exists another stable configuration
s′ 6= s. Therefore, there is a player p and coins c 6= c′ s.t. p ∈ Pc(s) and p ∈ Pc′(s′). By
Assumption 2, F (c)Mc(s) 6=
F (c′)
Mc′ (s′)
. Thus, up(s′) 6= up(s). If up(s′) > up(s), then we are done.
Otherwise, by Observation 3, there is another player p′ 6= p s.t. up′(s′) > up′(s).
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Claim 7. Consider a game GΠ,C,F , a configuration s ∈ S, a coin c ∈ C, and two miners p, p′ ∈
Pc(s) s.t. mp ≤ mp′ . If p is stable in s, then p′ is stable in s as well.
Proof. Since p is stable in s, we get that F (c) mpMc(s) ≥ F (c′)
mp
Mc′ (s)+mp
for every c′ ∈ C. Thus,
F (c) 1Mc(s) ≥ F (c′) 1Mc′ (s)+mp for every c
′ ∈ C. Since, mp ≤ mp′ , it follows that F (c) 1Mc(s) ≥
F (c′) 1Mc′ (s)+mp′ for every c
′ ∈ C. Thus, F (c) mp′Mc(s) ≥ F (c′)
mp′
Mc′ (s)+mp′
for every c′ ∈ C, and p′
is stable in s.
Claim 5 (restated). Let F be a reward function. Consider a system Q = 〈Π, C〉, and a configuration
s ∈ SQ. Now consider another system Q′ = 〈Π′, C〉 s.t. Π′ = Π ∪ {pnew}, pnew 6∈ Π, and
mpnew ≤ min{mp|p ∈ Π}. Let c = argmax
c′∈C
F (c′) mpnewMc′ (s)+mpnew and consider a configuration
s′ ∈ SQ′ s.t. for all p ∈ Π s′.p = s.p and s′.pnew = c. Then pnew is stable in s′ in game GΠ′,C,F ,
and every player p ∈ Π that is stable in s in GΠ,C,F is also stable in s′ in GΠ′,C,F .
Proof. By construction of configuration s′, Mc(s′) = Mc(s) + mpnew and ∀c′ 6= c Mc′(s′) =
Mc′(s). Therefore, by the way we pick c, we get that F (c)
mpnew
Mc(s′)
≥ F (c′) mpnewMc′ (s′) for all c
′ ∈ C, and
thus pnew is stable in s′. Now consider a player p ∈ Π that is stable in s, we show that p is stable
also in s′. Consider two cases:
• First, p ∈ Pc′(s′) s.t. c 6= c′. By construction, p ∈ Pc′(s), and since p is stable in s we
know that F (c′) mpMc′ (s) ≥ F (c
′′) mpMc′′ (s)+mp for every c
′′ ∈ C. Now since Mc(s′) > Mc(s)
and for all c′′ 6= c, Mc′′(s′) = Mc′′(s), we get F (c′) mpMc′ (s′) ≥ F (c
′′) mpMc′′ (s′)+mp for every
c′′ ∈ C. Meaning that p is stable in s′.
• Second, p ∈ Pc(s′). Since pnew is stable in s′ and mp ≥ mpnew , we get by Claim 7 that p
is stable in s′.
Lemma 2. Any game GΠ,C,F under Assumptions 1 and 2 has at least two different stable configura-
tions.
Proof. Let p1, . . . , pn be the miners in Π sorted in decreasing mining power, i.e., mp1 ≥ mp2 ≥
. . . ≥ mpn and let c1, . . . , cl be the coins in C sorted in decreasing coin rewards, i.e., F (c1) ≥
F (c2) ≥ . . . ≥ F (cl). Note that through the proof we construct several games, but we assume
Assumptions 1 and 2 only in the game GΠ,C,F . Let Π1, . . . ,Πn be a sequence of sets of miners
s.t. Πk = {p1, . . . , pk}, 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Next consider two configurations s21, s22 in game GΠ2,C,F :
s21 = 〈c1, c2〉 (i.e., s21.p1 = c1 and s21.p2 = c2) and s22 = 〈c2, c1〉. Note that s21 6= s22, and since
F (c1) ≥ F (c2), p1 is stable in s21 and p2 is stable in s22.
We now use s21, s
2
2 to inductively construct a sequence of tuples of configurations
〈s21, s22〉, 〈s31, s32〉, . . . , 〈sn1 , sn2 〉, where ∀ 2 ≤ k ≤ n, sk1 , sk2 are two configurations in Game GΠk,C,F .
For every 3 ≤ k ≤ n let x1 = argmax
c∈C
F (c)
mpk
Mc(s
k−1
1 )+mpk
and x2 = argmax
c∈C
F (c)
mpk
Mc(s
k−1
2 )+mpk
,
we construct sk1 = s
k−1
1 ×x1 (i.e., ∀1 ≤ i < k, sk1 .pi = sk−11 .pi and sk1 .pk = x1) and sk2 = sk−12 ×x2.
Note that since s21 6= s22, we get by construction that sn1 6= sn2 . It remains to show that configurations
sn1 and s
n
2 are stable. Assume by way of contradiction that it is not the case, and assume w.l.o.g. that
sn1 is not stable. By inductively applying Claim 5, and since p1 is stable in s
2
1 we get that players p1
and p3, . . . , pn are stable in sn1 . Thus p2 is not stable. Recall that s
2
1.p2 = c2, and thus by construction
sn1 .p2 = c2. Recall also that we assume Assumptions 1 and 2, and consider two cases:
• First, |Pc2(sn1 )| = 1 . By Assumption 1, there is a miner p ∈ Π s.t. changing sn1 .p to c2 is a
better response step for p. Thus, p is not stable in sn1 . In addition, by definition of better
response step, we know that pi 6= p2. A contradiction to p2 being the only not stable miner
in sn1 .
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• Second, |Pc2(sn1 )| > 1. Since p1 ∈ Pc1(s21), we get that there is a stable miner p ∈ Pc2(s21)
s.t. p ∈ {p3, . . . , pn}, and thus, m2 ≥ mp. Therefore, by Claim 7, we get that p2 is stable
in sn1 . A contradiction.
Appendix E Reward design: proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 (restated). Consider a configuration s ∈ Ti \ {si}. Then every better response learning in
the game GΠ,C,Hi(s) that starts at s converges to a configuration s
′ ∈ Ti such that:
1. ∀k, 1 ≤ k < mi(s), s′.pk = s.pk.
2. s′.pmi(s) = sf .pi.
Proof. Let c = sf .pi−1 and c′ = sf .pi. By definition of mi(s), and since s 6= si we know that
pmi(s) ∈ Pc(s). We first show that the only better response step in configuration s in gameGΠ,C,Hi(s)
is that pmi(s) moves to c
′. Since ∀c′′ 6= c′, RPUc′′(s) = R(s) and RPUc′(s) > R(s), we get that
no miner has a better response step to move to any coin c′′ 6= c′. Since mpmi(s) < mpai(s) , we get
that RPUc′((s−pmi(s) , c
′)) =
R(s)·(Mc′ (s)+mpai(s) )
Mc′ (s)+mpmi(s)
> R(s) = RPUc(s), and thus moving to c′ is a
better response step for pmi(s) in s. Now consider a miner pk 6∈ Pc′(s) s.t. k 6= mi(s). By definition
of mi(s), k < mi(s), thus mpk > mpmi(s) , and thus,
R(s)·(Mc′ (s)+mpai(s) )
Mc′ (s)+mpk
≤ R(s). All in all, we
get that the only better response step in configuration s is that pmi(s) moves to c
′.
Let s0 = (s−pmi(s) , c
′) be the configuration reached after pmi(s) takes its step. We next prove by
induction that every configuration s′ that is reached by better response steps staring from s0 satisfies
the following properties:
Ψ1. ∀k, 1 ≤ k < mi(s): s′.pk = s.pk.
Ψ2. s′.pmi(s) = c
′.
Ψ3. ∀k, mi(s) < k ≤ n: s′.pk ∈ {c, c′}.
Ψ4. Mc(s0) ≤Mc(s′) ≤Mc(s).
Ψ5. Mc′(s) ≤Mc′(s′) ≤Mc′(s0).
Note that since s ∈ Ti, Ψ1 −Ψ3 imply that s′ ∈ Ti.
Base. We show below that the properties Ψ1 −Ψ5 are satisfied for configuration s0.
Ψ1 −Ψ3. Follow by definitions of mi(s) and Ti, and since s0 = (s−pmi(s) , c′).
Ψ4 −Ψ5. Trivially follows.
Induction step. Consider two configurations s1, s2 ∈ S s.t. a better response step of some miner
leads from s1 to s2, and s1 satisfies properties Ψ1−Ψ5. We show that s2 satisfies properties Ψ1−Ψ5
as well.
Useful equations for configuration s1. We start by proving two useful equations on the RPUs of
coins c and c′ in configuration s1 using Ψ4 and Ψ5:
By Ψ4, Mc(s1) ≤Mc(s). In addition, since Hi(s)(c) = R(s) ·Mc(s), we get that
RPUc(s
1) =
Hi(s)(c)
Mc(s1)
=
R(s) ·Mc(s)
Mc(s1)
≥ R(s) ·Mc(s)
Mc(s)
= R(s). (7)
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By Ψ5, Mc′(s1) ≤ Mc′(s0). In addition, since (1) mpmi(s) < mpai(s) , (2) Mc′(s) = Mc′(s0) −
mpmi(s) , and (3) Hi(s)(c
′) = R(s) · (Mc′(s) + mpai(s)), we get that
RPUc′(s
1) =
Hi(s)(c
′)
Mc′(s1)
=
R(s) · (Mc′(s) + mpai(s))
Mc′(s1)
=
R(s) · (Mc′(s0)−mpmi(s) + mpai(s))
Mc′(s1)
≥ R(s) ·Mc′(s
0)
Mc′(s0)
= R(s).
(8)
Useful equations for configurations s1 and s2. We now prove two useful equations on the RPUs
of coins not in {c, c′} in configurations that satisfy Ψ1 −Ψ3.
By definition of Hi, ∀c′′ 6∈ {c, c′}, Hi(s)(c′′) = R(s) · Mc′′(s). Since s ∈ Ti, ∀k, i ≤ k ≤
n : s.pk ∈ {c, c′}, and by definition of mi(s), we know that mi(s) ≥ i. Therefore, by Ψ1 −Ψ3, we
get that
∀c′′ 6∈ {c, c′}, Mc′′(s1) = Mc′′(s), (9)
and thus
∀c′′ 6∈ {c, c′}, RPUc′′(s1) = Hi(s)(c
′′)
Mc′′(s1)
=
R(s) ·Mc′′(s)
Mc′′(s)
= R(s). (10)
Induction step proof. We are now ready to prove that s2 satisfies properties Ψ1 −Ψ5.
Ψ1 −Ψ2. Since Ψ1 and Ψ2 hold in s1, we only need to show that p1, . . . , pmi(s) are stable in s1. Let
k ∈ {1, . . . ,mi(s)} and note that mpk ≥ mpmi(s) . By Equation 10, for all c′′ 6∈ {c, c′},
RPUc′′(s
1) = R(s), and by Equations 7 and 8, we know that RPUc(s1) ≥ R(s) and
RPUc′(s
1) ≥ R(s), respectively. Therefore, it remains to show that pk does not have a
better response step to c or c′:
– By Ψ4, Mc(s1) ≥Mc(s0), and thus we get that
Hi(c)
Mc(s1) + mpk
≤ Hi(c)
Mc(s0) + mpmi(s)
=
Hi(c)
Mc(s)
=
Mc(s) ·R(s)
Mc(s)
= R(s).
Therefore, pk does not have a better response step to c.
– By Ψ2, pmi(s) ∈ Pc′(s1). Therefore, if pk = pmi(s), then we are done. Otherwise,
k < mi(s) = ai(s) + 1, so mpk ≥ mpai(s) . By Ψ5, Mc′(s1) ≥Mc′(s), and thus
Hi(c
′)
Mc′(s1) + mpk
≤ Hi(c
′)
Mc′(s) + mpai(s)
=
R(s) · (Mc′(s) + mpai(s))
Mc′(s) + mpai(s)
= R(s).
Therefore, pk does not have a better response step to c′.
Ψ3. By Equations 7 and 8, RPUc(s1) ≥ R(s) and RPUc′(s1) ≥ R(s). By Equation 10, for
all c′′ 6∈ {c, c′}, RPUc′′(s1) = R(s). Therefore, since by the inductive assumption (Ψ3),
miners pmi(s)+1, . . . , pn are in Pc(s
1) ∪ Pc′(s1), we get that none of them has a better
response step to move to a coin c′′ 6∈ {c, c′}, and thus Ψ3 holds in s2 as well.
Ψ4. By definitions of s0, mi(s), and Ti, we know that Pc(s0) ∩ {pmi(s), . . . , pn} = ∅. Since
Ψ1 holds in s0 and in s1, we get that ∀k, 1 ≤ k < mi(s): s1.pk = s0.pk. Therefore, we
get that Mc(s0) ≤ Mc(s2). It remains to show that Mc(s2) ≤ Mc(s). By Equation 10,
for all c′′ 6∈ {c, c′}, RPUc′′(s1) = R(s). By Equations 7 and 8, RPUc(s1) ≥ R(s) and
RPUc′(s
1) ≥ R(s). Now assume by way of contradiction that Mc(s2) > Mc(s). Thus,
RPUc(s
2) =
Hi(c)
Mc(s2)
<
Hi(c)
Mc(s)
=
R(s) ·Mc(s)
Mc(s)
= R(s).
Now since RPUc(s2) < R(s) ≤ RPUc(s1), we get that s2 = (s1−p, c) for some p ∈ Π. A
contradiction to Observation 2.
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Ψ5. Since we already showed that s2 satisfies Ψ1 − Ψ3, by Equation 9, we get that
∀c′′ 6∈ {c, c′}, Mc′′(s2) = Mc′′(s). In addition, since s0 = (s−pmi(s) , c′), ∀c′′ 6∈
{c, c′}, Mc′′(s0) = Mc′′(s). Therefore, we get that ∀c′′ 6∈ {c, c′}, Mc′′(s) = Mc′′(s0) =
Mc′′(s
2), and thus Mc(s2) + Mc′(s2) = Mc(s0) + Mc′(s0) = Mc(s) + Mc′(s). Hence,
Ψ5 follows from Ψ4.
Now together with Theorem 1, we know that every better response learning in the game GΠ,C,Hi(s)
that starts at s converges to some configuration s′ that satisfies Ψ1 −Ψ5. Since s ∈ Ti, we get that
(∀k, 1 ≤ k ≤ i− 1 : s.pk = sf .pk) ∧ (∀k, i ≤ k ≤ n : s.pk ∈ {sf .pi, sf .pi−1}).
And since s 6= si, we get that i ≤ mi(s). Thus, by Ψ1, ∀k, 1 ≤ k ≤ i − 1 : s′.pk = sf .pk. In
addition, by Ψ3, we get that ∀k, i ≤ k ≤ n, s.pk ∈ {sf .pi, sf .pi−1}. Therefore, s′ ∈ Ti, and the
lemma follows from Ψ1 and Ψ2.
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